Is Ontology of Knowledge a solipsism? Jean-Louis Boucon Introduction: The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) states: The laws of the world cannot be distinguished from the laws by which representation emerges from intensional thought. The laws of a physical world in vis-à-vis are not necessary. The forms of the world resulting from these laws cannot be distinguished from the laws of thought. They have no object. (see appendix I) OK seems to make of Knowledge, the substance from which the subject gives rise for himself to a representation of the world and himself. The OK is realistic in that it states that there is a reality, but it also states clearly that the Reality is informal and that there is no being in reality, no other beings than those created by the subject in representation. That justifies the title of this article: Would the knowing subject be, in fact, the only being in the world, all other beings being only representation? While the Cogito guarantees the Existence of the "I" that enunciates it, is there no other Me than this "I"? As much as our mind can consent to the idea that objects and material facts are only representations, including the atoms of our own body, as much as it seems absurd to us, paradoxical, contrary to the evidence of every moment, the idea that "I" would be the one and only knowing subject. The first part of this article proposes, by a clarification of concepts and terms, to answer specifically to the question of the existence of other "I's" The second part will try to widen the spectrum of our reflection to study, within the conceptual framework of the OK, the possibility of a supra-human thought/knowledge. Of a "Us" 1Are there others "I's" ? Before attempting an answer this question, we need to clarify some terms used by the OK. A Knowledge is a set of Interdependencies stemming from a Point of View. Nothing psychological or electro-chemical. The Logos (principle of creation of meaning) aggregates Knowledge into singularities or Facts of Knowledge. The Point of View is the virtual focal point of this aggregation. The point of view is also the asymptote of the individuation, the "I" of the knowing subject. Each Fact of Knowledge appears circumscribed by a cut. The cut is the place of the Act by which appears the Meaning of the Fact of Knowledge. To Exist is nothing else but "to be represented by-" or "to have Meaning for-" the conscience / subject. To Exist is not an universal truth but relative to the subject. The Meaning of a Fact of Knowledge is a law of probability on the Facts of knowledge it makes possible, on the Facts that may appear when representation will expand towards its logical neighbourhoud This too brief introduction can be completed by reading the introduction to Ontology of Knowledge (Ref OdC). The vocabulary being fixed, we can distinguish 3 levels in the concept of the "self": 1My Knowledge, which is the set of Interdependencies stemming from my Point of View. It is also my thought/object or intensionnal thought. My Knowledge, my thought/object is infinite, unfounded and therefore unknowable as such. 2The (present) representation of the world, that appears to me in the form of Facts of Knowledge whose cuts (the Acts) present the Meaning. Among these facts there is the one whose cut presents the conscious thought or thought/subject. The thought/subject represents the world of common sense and science. It is to the thought/subject that events, beings and laws appear. 3The "I" is the virtual asymptote of the Individuation of the knowing subject. The "I" is that point towards which seem to converge all the determinations coming from the world which presents to me, it is also this common becoming around which spiral all the microscopic processes of my physical body, it is also the common subject of all my conscious thoughts. The example of a drawing in perspective makes it possible to illustrate the virtuality of the "I". In a painting, the rules of perspective define the virtual position of a point of view, in a virtual geometry, so virtual that the point of view seems to be outside the materiality of the painting. In reality, the position of the point of view results from a set of rules applied to each Fact of the drawing. The point of view is unique, even if the image seems to allow other points of view. Even if in the painting there may be other characters represented that also seem to have a point of view on the object of the painting, there is only one perspective, one order and this order is relative to a point of view that is defined by the whole painting. In a perspective drawing, it is impossible to place a "Fact" at the virtual point of view. Everything is Fact in the drawing, but the point of view, although determined by the Facts in the drawing, is not a Fact. It is a rule, a meta-Fact of judgment, not on the Facts of the drawing, but on relations between the Facts of the drawing. The "I" is the unique point of view in relation to which the representation is ordained. Note: In this example, it is also remarkable that the disposition of the Facts that appears to the thought/subject emerges from a global rule on the entire chart and not just sensations of individual positions of objective Facts. Space is not solved by a juxtaposition of individual positions, but requires a prior meta-judgment on the entire picture from which the aperception of positions will emerge. [20191207] It is also noted that the double meaning of the word "perspective" both as a (prior) technique of representation and as a (present) representation is not fortuitous because there is indeed no real difference between "how I perceive" and "what I perceive" . [20200325] We owe Whitehead an analysis of perspective as a way of structuring conscious thinking. ref: OLAG Appendix V Having shown the uniqueness and virtuality of the "I", let's see how I Exist for myself. The world, the physical self, my thoughts Exist for my consciousness/subject in the form of a representation that is relative to me. Meaning is revealed by the Transaction that replaces the unfathomable, formless, unspeakable reality of the Fact (what the OK calls its In-Act) by laws of probability on the outcome of the Act. Meaning does not present to me what the Fact is, its intensionnal reality, for the Fact is not "something" Meaning presents what I can expect of it, new Facts it makes probable for me. Now the "I" is Individuation. Its meaning is precisely the certainty (probability =1) for myself to exist still as myself. The need for thought/subject to represent itself in the form of probabilities is the very essence of its Anima, of its contingent dynamics, of the necessary flight forward of the present of representation. Thus, my self that Exists for me is not "something" but the meaning of a Fact of knowledge, of an unfounded structure. What appears to me from this self is a set of probability laws extracted from an unfathomable and formless reality. As for the intensionnal reality of this self, it does not Exist for me. An infinity of infinites of meanings are actual in there but they do not Exist for me. The intensionnal reality of the self and what appears to me as me/subject are incommensurable to each other. The reality of the self is far beyond the psychological notion of the unconscious. In ref: MOND we write: If with Schopenhauer we state that "the world is my representation" which implies that "The world is the meaning of my Knowledge", we conclude that the focal point of categorical synthesis, as a principle subsumed by the knowing subject, can only be the "I" of the subject. So if this "Myself" that exists for me is not "something", the "others" that exist for me are not more "something" The "I" is the focal point of the categorial synthesis, the category of all categories of my representation, the category of which the only element is the "I" The "I" is therefore not the "container" of representation but a category of representation. The "I" is not the prior condition to the emergence and agglomeration of Meaning, it is an individuated solution among infinity of infinities of individuated solutions. The Logos, principe of the representation, logically transcends the Individuation of Meaning and therefore the "I". The Logos transcends the very concept of Unity. Thus, if the others who Exist for me are not "something", that "Self" who exists for me is not "something" either. In my representation of the world, others "subjects" exist in the same terms as exist the "me/subject" i.e. as Facts of Knowledge. I only know their Meaning as it appears to me. Their reality, as well as my reality, are unknowable to me. My "self/object", the intensionnal reality from which emerges the meaning of my "self/subject", it is unknowable to me as much as are the intensionnal realities of other "subjects". Qualitatively, I see little more of my thought/subject than the thought/subject of others. My thought is only the experience I have of my thought. The means of experience of my thought seem to me quantitatively more extensive than the means of experience of the thought of others, we have shown (Ref LAEG app V ) that " the Existence of the world is included in the Existence of the subject of which the totality cannot exceed a mere certitude", in other words the totality of the Existence of all facts of my experience of the world, and a fortiori of all the other"subjects", cannot exceed my own Existence. If it is true that quantitatively the "I" subsumes the Existence of all other subjects, qualitatively the "I" remains in an unknowable relation with the unfathomable reality of my thought/object, of my Knowledge. I know myself as superficially that I knows others. Moreover, the means of experience of my thought/subject are the signs, inseparable union of the signified (the concept) and the signifier (the word). What is revealed to me from my thought/subject is thus structured by words, just as what is revealed to me from the thought of others. In conclusion: 1the other "subjects" Exist qualitatively in the same terms as the "me /subject". 2the "I" is only a category, a meta-fact of my representation. 3My reality is as unknowable to me as the reality of others. In that sense, the OK is in no way a solipsism. What profoundly differentiates the OK's "vision of others" from the "vision of others" according to common sense (or more precisely: according to the Western common metaphysics) revolves around the notion of Existence: For OK, Existing means making sense for a subject. It is not a universal truth (as long as the word has meaning here) but a truth relative to the subject. On the other hand, the predicate of the Existence of a being: the proposition "this exists" does not reflect an intensional reality of "this" (of which I know only the surface) but the extensional probability of seeing "this" still exist among the other Facts of my representation. It follows that if the others seem to me to exist distinctly from each other and from myself, it is only extensionnally, on the surface and since we co-exist in this world that I represent, we probably share its intensional reality. On the other hand, "I" am the point of view of the perspective I have of myself and others, in that they appear to me in my time, my space, my universe. "I" am the center of my world, not by accident but by essence; because the Logos defines me as the sum and center of all that Exists for me and in this sense "I" can only be unique. If there are other centres, others "I," they are the "I" of another world, they are the sum and the centre of another representation instance, in an unknowable relationship to the world of which I am the sum and the centre. 2-Is there a collective thought ? In advance, it would be desirable to have read the article "The philosophy of langage and OK" (Ref:PLOC) 2-1 Language We will show, by the example of language, that there is at least one thought (i.e. a knowledge) of Humanity. F. de Saussure distinguished 'Language from Word'; N. Chomski distinguishes 'Competence from Performance' (Ref LDP); The OK distinguishes 'the In-Act from the Act' These distinctions are quite similar for what is their objects: the first term is more or less the timeless substance of meaning *, the set of conditions of possibility (of words and rules) of the discourse, and the second term describes the temporal transaction by which the discourse happens and by which its meaning is revealed. * limited to the synchronic aspect of the language, i.e. ignoring its evolution in the temporality of a culture. To answer the question posed in 2 we will also have to consider a third aspect that could be referred to as the "Language Transaction" or "Intersubjective Exchange": which specifically concerns the exchange as an act as well as the reciprocal intentionality of the speaker and the listener. On the other hand, we take for granted the abandonment of the referencing of a word (and the meaning of a Fact, in general) to a formal reality vis-à-vis, this point is dealt with in detail in articles ref ODC, MOND, PLOC. The meaning of the word is in the other words and concepts that it makes probable. De Saussure also associated inseparably in the sign: the word (the psychic image), conventional signifier, to the concept (the signified). Of what he deduced the postulate that "there can be no thought without language" and that "Apart from its expression by words, our thought is only an amorphous and indistinct mass (...) taken in itself thought is like a nebula where nothing is necessarily delimited. " Ref: OdC By this de Saussure refused to thought any prevalence on language. He showed that there can be no thought without language, that the word forms the thought as much as thought forms the word. At all time scales of the living, language will have helped to develop thought just as much as thought has helped to develop language. Learning to name a set of sensations by a word (and to attach a concept to it) is not simply situating it in an extensional vocabulary, defining its relationship to other words, it is also and maybe above all, focusing our intentionality, learning to isolate a set of sensations and unite it into One individuated whole. The Object Exists by the word (by the sign) that designates it. Limiting language to the role of the expression mean of an already present thought would be an error. It would also be wrong to limit speech to the act that "uses" an already structured language (words and syntax): though each speech is an instance of use of language words and rules, it is also a quantum of reinforcement of the attractivity of these words and rules, of these Facts of Knowledge. It is also by speech that the language competence develops in the individual, by learning. Each word expressed helps to create language, individually and collectively. The words, syntagms and sentences structure the timeless substance of language competence before letting the Meaning emerge from its performance in the moment. Since language and thought create eachother reciprocally, we could just as well write: The words, syntagms and sentences structure the timeless substance of the thought/object before letting the Meaning of Facts emerge in the present moment of the thought/subject. But the structure of thought/object is none other than the perspective of the subject. Certainly words, syntagms and phrases are the instanciations that emerge from language. But also, with each use they grow, from possibly fortuitous germs, the prior footprints, they increase the importance of attractors that structure the perspective of the subject, not only his language competence but his perspective of the world. The term "substance" should not abuse us: the reality of thought/object as well as language is unfounded, unspeakable, non-meaning. There is no more "first word" than there is a "first Fact" or "first meaning." Each word is a category, a global judgment on an unfathomable reality. Words are significant cuts because they are non-complex entities. The intensionnal reality of thought/object, as of language, is at the informal level (the In-act) whereas speech is at the formal, representable level (the Act). Language and speech, signified and signifier, thought/object and thought/subject cannot be described in the same space. NB: This is why it is impossible to explain a concept with words; as impossible as filling a cube with dots. This similarity is more than formal, the language is part of the thought/object. Language has the same reality, made of interdependence, as thought/object, as Knowledge. Language is a chaos of possible whereas speech is a space of Acts. With the exception that if the thought/object, in the usual sense of the term, is structured, agglomerated into thought/subject and finally individuates into an "I", the language is structured, also aggregated into an extra thought. or supra-individual thought and finally individuates in what could be designated by the terms "cultures" or "humanity". Through language, Humanity Individuates and can speak in the first person. Language (competence, the In-act) is not a simple substance (the words) or metasubstance (the rules of syntax), tool of interactions between individuated beings equipped with thought, it is not a product of individual thought, it is the structure of a collective thought (note 1). Thus, there is at least one Point of View, a subject, a collective thought, a "Us". If our representations seem so similar to us, it is because our thoughts take shape from the Facts of Knowledge made possible by speech. It is the acquired language/competence that allows us to attach a sound label to a category of possibles, to create the sign, to formulate our thought for ourself and for others. Language competence is the reality of a collective thought. Language competence contains In-act both the Power of Expansion of Collective Knowledge and the Will that directs it. The speech is the Act by which the Meaning of the collective thought is revealed and by which the conditions of its structuration are created. The "I" of this collective thought is the virtual asymptote towards which this structuration seems to converge. Here appears a profound difference between the OK's "vision of others" and common sense: Since: -I am representation. -New representations emerge from my intensional reality from the ever-already-present perspective in my intensional reality. -Language competence is part of my intensional reality. -Language competence is also part of the intensional reality of collective thought. It follows that: Collective thought is, at least in part, a "common logical part", a common part of Knowledge, to me and to other "knowing subjects". Even if we appear to ourselves individuated and distinct, since we are representations, we have in common a part of intensional reality. Let us understand ourselves well: this common Knowledge is not "something" of which each subject would have "in him" a more or less complete copy, but really as a common system of logical equations, of which each subject would be a particular solution. This Common Knowledge is immeasurable to thoughts/subject, it is no more possible for us to say that we are contained in it than to say that we contain it. We are simply one of the possible Meanings of reality. note 1: All grammatically possible sentences of language are Actual; so much so that no one can say that such a sentence has never been pronounced. Only the sentences that form in my mind, which I pronounce or hear, come to Exist for me. My language competence presents a non-zero probability of these sentences. My perspective gives them importance. They have a non-zero probability of Existing again in my thought/object. 2-2: Extension to other modes of exchange: The same analysis, with the same conclusions, applies to all modes of intersubjective exchange that are both created by thought and creators of thought (let's include body language, arts, techniques, mathematics ..). Regarding techniques, G. Simondon (Ref: Simondon) has shown that technologies, their protocols and their productions, structure our culture and therefore our thinking in ways similar to language. In the In-act, in the intensional of the word "bread" for example, even before it makes sense to our conscience, billions of technological facts are buried. Even more striking is the impact of technology on the concept associated with the words "far" or "distance" 2-3: Intersubjective exchange: We have seen that the intersubjective exchange attests to the reality of a "we" as a meta-subject. Let us now see if, for the knowing subject, it can attest to the objective existence or a minima of an objectivable (universal) formal aspect of the other subjects. If so, the concept of morphogenesis and OdC would be shown to be false. The logical content of the exchange: Refs: ODC and MOND show that even for its own Knowledge, a subject cannot establish with certainty equality A=A. This is unprovable, because the intensional reality of A is complex and unfounded. Even when the meaning of a Fact, a predicate appears necessary for the subject, i.e. it cannot be other without questioning the Existence of the subject itself, this necessity is "contingent to infinity", it is a judgment, an Act. This judgment is not produced by the understanding or reason of the subject, it is a judgment of fact, a probability equal to one. Facts of Knowledgeonly make sense, by the relationship they have with each other. Even the predicate of unity, applicable to the attractor, to the singularity, as absolute as its meaning may seem, is impossible to establish firmly since: on the one hand it has no instance (nothing is One in reality, it is an empty category) and on the other hand its insertion into an arithmetic or in any variety is constrained by the subsumption of this variety by the Existence of the subject, as shown in ref.OLAG The extensional meaning of the Facts is approximate, based on judgments. The same is true for language signs (word + concept, signifiant+ signified) that are Facts of Knowledge. A fortiori in the intersubjective sharing of meaning, if Alice cannot prove for herself that A=A, Alice's Aa cannot be proven to be equal to Bob's Ab. It doesn't matter after all: Alice and Bob may well be content with an isomorphy between their representations: Everything will be fine if, when Alice asks Bob for a screwdriver, it is the object she calls screwdriver that he gives her. Similarly, when she asks him for the larger of the two screwdrivers, it is what she calls "the greatest" she gets. It should be noted that this concept of "isomorphism" does not correspond to the strict mathematical definition, because: on the one hand, morphogenesis is not a synthesis of forms according to a transcendent, universal and deterministic law, so it is impossible to establish a formal proof of the isomorphism of representations which could de jure be worth for all subjects independently; on the other hand, as we saw in the ref MOND, the subject is the only reference of his representations. The Meaning is neither true nor isomorphic, but only idoneous, i.e. such that the conjectures associated with the Meaning realize without hiatus that would break the thread of the subject's Individuation. The only opinion Alice can express about her dialogue with Bob would be "it suits me" and vice versa. The isomorphy of representations and languages should therefore be given the weak meaning of "reciprocal idoneity": Alice has of Bob and the content of their exchanges an idoneous representation, and vice versa. 2-4: The Act of Exchange: The question now is: beyond the exchange of semantic content, which we have seen that it does not bring objectivity to the representations of the interlocutors, can we highlight an objective element in the Act of exchange itself? At first glance, it seems that in the Act of intersubjective exchange there is a part that is not a set of concepts falling under isomorphia, but a Fact of Knowledge falling under direct aperception. Since this fact makes sense (apparently) for Alice and Bob, is it possible that characters attach to it, attributes objectively having "the same formal value" for Alice and Bob and by extension for any other knowing subject, including for my dog when I call him or my goldfish. Are Alice and Bob really just the idoneous subjective representation of one by the other or does the Act of Exchange reveal a personal identity that is objectivable in reality? Will we find in the act of exchange the clues of a being/object vis-à-vis Alice? Let us see if the five indexicals attached to the language exchange, which are usually referred to as "I, you, this, now, here," present some objective reference element. The meaning of indexicals, beyond their general concept, is instanciated by the factual circumstances of the Act of Exchange and is then supposed to be the same for the two interlocutors: I: is the speaker, You: is the listener, this: is the message as individuated fact, regardless of its meaning, Now: is the moment of the Act, Here: is the place of the Act. ● I and you: We have shown in paragraph 1 that the I and the you do not have the same meaning for the speaker and the listener, so do not look for objective elements. While the Propositionnal Act, just as the Cogito states and proves a "I Exist", this evidence applies only to the subject, the speaker. ● This: There are many examples that show that the very existence of the that of a message is not objective: a look can be ignored, a gesture can remain unnoticed, coded information can only appear through a decryption key. Let's also consider what it takes of prior conventions to simply distinguish a message from its sound, visual, olfactory or sensory environment. Let us also consider what it takes for preconditions in the physical world (which is only idoneous representations by both subjects) to make the that Exist. ● Now and Here: Our analysis focuses on the now and here of the Act of Exchange and not on the possible moments and places defined by the meaning of the message. The analysis should not, of course, presuppose an objective space-time. The question is: without prejudging time and space, are there elements objectively common to the now and here, as experienced by each of the interlocutors, that would show the objective reality of a moment and a place of exchange (and therefore of the world)? As for time, how can we not believe that Bob hears Alice say "cat" at the objective moment when she says "cat"? But at what moment does Alice say "cat"? In 2008, Doctor JD Haynes [1] and a research team made an experiment whose result can be summarized so: We found that the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness. [1] Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain (Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes) Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Haus 6, Philippstrasse 13, 10115 Berlin, Germany. Nature Neuroscience paru le 13 avril 2008. A few minutes of reflection show that this "now" of the word "cat" only makes sense to Alice in her extensional representation: When and where, in Alice's intensional reality, does this word become possible, then probable, then necessary, then existing, then condition of possibility of the next word? The same enumeration applies to Bob's, even more clearly since we have shown that the sound sensation emerges from his overall perspective of the subject (ref OdC). Except to prejudge time, one cannot distinguish the "this" of the message from its conditions of possibility, whether it is logical in appearance: (what is a cat?) or physical: (why are Alice and Bob within range of voices ?...). This is true for both the speaker and the listener. An entire book would not be enough for logicians, psychologists, neurobiologists, linguists ... to list the conditions for the possibility of the word "cat" uttered by Alice. It is to an unfounded, unfathomable network of Acts, each with its "present moment" that the word spoken by Alice as well as the word understood by Bob must be attached. To think that the conditions of possibility are "already fulfilled" and that only the message is new is indeed a circular reasoning, taking time as a postulate for a reasoning that would show the reality of time. So it's not about uncertainty on the duration of the "now". The "now" of the exchange cannot be objectively part of a time interval, any more than of a moment. It is a principle: the "now" of the exchange results from a judgment, i.e. from the projection of the intensional* reality of the locution (resp. of the audition), through the perspective of the speaker (resp. of the listener), on the subjective (monodimensional) time of her.his representation. *Unfounded, out of time and space It should be noted without further detail that, for the subject, here and now integrate with the "I", the virtual focal point of the Individuation of the Meaning. The now of the intersubjective exchange is built subjectively. In the intersubjective exchange it is always about isomorphism. The isomorphy of our representations does not attest to an objective formal existence or an objectivable (i.e. universal) formal aspect of the other subjects. The judgment that associates subjective but compatible this, now and here, is a stitch by which the isomorphism of the representations of Alice and Bob builts by itself. To generalize it will be said that the space-time of our intersubjective exchanges is a fourdimensional variety (surface), place of a set of points (intersubjective Facts) where our representations are stitch and make compatible with each other. 2-5 Transcendence of Isomorphism: The idoneity of representation by a subject is also the idoneity of his perspective, that of the structure of interdependencies from which emerge the elements of meaning ordered according to their relative importance. The Idoneity of representations is essential, necessary and Actual (out of time) (ref MOND) Although this structure appears to the subject as forming the present conditions of possibility of meaning: its reality is beyond the horizon of meaning ie out of time and space and of all forms. Unspeakable. It is in this unspeakable part of the conditions of possibility of the Meaning that we must seek for Alice as for Bob, the reciprocal idoneity of their representations. It is not about a common substance but about the structure of the judgments that give form. Alice and Bob's perspectives refer to isomorphic classes. It is not known whether these classes are intensionally comparable, but they are extensionnaly compatible. It is not only about language and other modes of exchange but also about everything that creates the logical conditions for the possibility of a common "presence" i.e. the possibilities of intersubjective exchange. A first degree of understanding (intuitive but misleading) could make us say that Alice and Bob adjust their perspectives as they exchange, until Bob finally passes to Alice the screwdriver she asks for! This understanding is misleading because the isomorphy of perspectives then appears as a kind of Darwinian evolutionary advantage, as a present condition of possibility of exchange, whereas we have just seen that the reality of our perspectives is out of time. In the ref MOND and BQOC it is shown that if the perspective of the subject remains idoneous, it is not by chance, by accident, nor by a series of trials and errors, nor by the design of a supreme being but because the thread of Individuation that follows this "me" represents an Actual instance of a necessary principle, giving meaning to an Actual reality , i.e. out of time. This essential idoneity requires admitting at a minimum that our future representations already have a certain mode of reality: The Meaning does not affect reality in any way: all possible orders are out of time, they are Actual (according to the OdC terms). As the representation extends to its neighbourhood along the subject's time, the meaning of the Fact, the judgment of possibility of other Facts, becomes probability, conjecture, certainty. All these certainties are subsumed by the certainty for the "I" to still be. But nothing really changes. This necessity of the "I," of the individuation of meaning, is an eigen-solution to the principle of individuation. The perspective of a subject is for itself and in essence, coherent, consistent, complete, idoneous. The individuation of the subject seems to him as an always future promise or as a condition of survival but beyond the horizon of meaning, it is Actual. The conditions of my consistency are "out of time.*" The conditions of the idoneity of my representation are "out of time.*" The same is true of the conditions of intersubjective exchange: The perspective of a humanity is for itself and in essence coherent, consistent, complete, idoneous. The necessary Individuation of our humanity is an Actual* eigen-solution of the principle of individuation. The conditions of "our" coherence are "out of time.*" The conditions of the isomorphy of "our" representations are "out of time.*" This last proposal is a draft response to certain quantum apories. *and space. Thus the isomorphy of our representations is not weak, as unprovable as it is. We have just shown that it transcends the Existence of the subject. The Actuality (in the OdC sense) of an Individuation of our humanity is a necessary part in the Actuality of the Individuation of each subject, which is the very principle of his Existence. 2-6 Cogitamus : Let's remember this version of the Cogito, generalized by the author: « .. The proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true, whenever I pronounce, or when I conceive in my mind of any proposition." We have also seen that the Act that utters the proposition cannot be separated from its conditions of possibility. Then, among these conditions, especially if the proposition makes sense (even if it is only for the subject who conceives it), there is language that transcends the subject. The Cogito remains true, but should it not be completed with a Cogitamus?: « .. The proposition: A Humanity Exists, is necessarily true, whenever I pronounce, or when I conceive in my mind of any proposition." I cannot think the Existence of the "We," yet the "We" Exists (to itself) by the fact that I think. 2-7 Question left open: How to conceive of intentionality in another subject? Appendix I Laws of the world or laws of thought Abstract: Experience does not validate the reality of the laws and forms of a vis-à-vis world. These cannot be distinguished from thought. They have no object. Development: In his 2nd metaphysical meditation, Descartes formulates the Cogito: « .. This proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true, whenever I pronounce it, or when I conceive it in my mind. ». What can be generalized by: « .. The proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true, whenever I pronounce, or when I conceive any proposal in my mind." Thus the proposition "A" or "A is true" implies (and proves) first and foremost the existence of the subject who conceives it. The "A" proposal is therefore incomplete since the knowing subject who speaks the proposal is formally absent from it, while its existence is attested for itself by this statement. To make the subject formally present you need a proposal such as "I know that A" or "I understand A" or "I believe that A". The question then is: In my representation of the world, if "I know that A" can it be that "non-A" ? Is it possible that A is represented by my mind as a thing of the world without an equivalent "in reality" in the world? Knowing how difficult it is to prove without the possibility of access to the real world, from our sensations alone, the equivalence of "I know that A" with an "A" vis-à-vis, the scientific method has devised a principle of pragmatic verification that can be summarised as follows: If the conjectures produced from my representation of the world are verified by experience, then my representation is equivalent to the world. In other words: if any relationship in representation: "I know that A"  "I know that B" has its equivalent A → B in the world, we can say that the representation is isomorphic of the world. The principle of verification can be schematicized by comparing the results of conjecture and experience in two parallel ways: 1a:(representation) A Sensation of A I know that A (conjecture) I know that B 1b:(experience) A→ B - (experience) Sensation of B I know that B "Legend: " → laws of the world  laws of thought A Facts of the World A Facts of Thought According to this principle, knowing A, we compare the relationship in representation: I know that AI know that B to the experience that we can make of the relationship A → B that occurs in the world vis-à-vis. If, by the way of experience, knowing A we also get I know that B, we can say that the relationship I know that AI know that B is equivalent to A → B According to this definition, isomorphism assumes nothing about the "proper" or "intensional" reality of the facts of world A and B, nor the facts of knowledge "I know that A" or "I know that B" or even relationships → in the world or  in thought. In Husserl's words, this principle defines an isomorphism of the world and its representation as multiplicities, limited to the extensional part of the two. "A, B..." are adopted by the subject in his world represented as equivalent to "A, B.." in a vis-à-vis world. There is nothing very extraordinary about this form of pragmatic realism. However, for the validation of equivalence to be effective, B must be a necessary condition for Sensation of B, which may be noted: Pr(sensation of B|non-B ) = 0 strictly Again without prejudging the intensional realities of B or the sensation of B. The problem is that... when it concerns the world vis-à-vis, the distinction between extensional and intensional realities arises exclusively from the intentionality (with a t) of the knowing subject(s). In the world vis-à-vis, the distinction between the all and its parts is nothing without the subject. There is no object without the subject, nor is there any action between objects. Without subjects, no laws of action between objects. Without a knowing subject the earth does not attract the moon for without intentionality there is neither earth nor moon. The one-dimensional vector attached to the moon's center of gravity results from our intentionality, as do the billions of billions of single-dimensional vectors attached to each of the moon's atoms and directed towards each of the earth's atoms. Without the intentionality of the subject what associates the earth and the moon, although real, is nothing that exists. The process we call "experience of B" therefore does not have the simplicity of fig.1b. The fact of knowledge "sensation of B" does not directly imply the (supposed) fact of the world "B". The transition we call experience is not a one-dimensional vector linking an individualized fact of the world (B) to an individual fact of knowledge (sensation of B). In their realities B and sensation of B are unspeakable complexities and the transition that is supposed to connect them is therefore also an unspeakable complexity. Physicists and neurobiologists have long attested to this. This transition is not governed by a deterministic law that would allow us to assert that Pr(sensation of B|non-B ) = 0, it is in fact an abundance of billions of interdependences of a probabilistic nature in which already appear by themselves quantities of singularities that are facts of thought. Sensation of B appears in its individuated and intelligible form to the subject only by emerging from his knowledge through a simplifying, individuating Transaction that marks the boundary between the intensional and the extensional, the unconscious and the conscious. This Transaction is already knowledge and conjecture of B issued from the knowledge of A plays a major role in it, if only by directing the intentionality of the subject towards the object of knowledge B. In many other ways it helps to define the perspective of the subject that will shape Sensation of B. From this, the philosophers of knowledge have long attested. conjecture of B lies in the knowledge of the subject not only in its dicible form: "I know I conjecture B" but also in its intensionality, the form of which is unknowable, including by the subject. In the intensionality of thought sensation of B cannot be discerned from conjecture of B or even from any other intelligible form. 1a (conjecture) sensation of B Intensional Thought Understanding 1b (experience) all intelligible sensations Informal Informal Formal Formal The emergence of sensations out of the relational chaos of intensional thought is a probabilistic logical phenomenon. In the hypothesis of the above diagram, the possibility of the emergence of the formal (intelligible) sensation of B out of intensional thought associates with the supposed experience of B (according to way 1b), the conjecture of B (according to way 1a) and all the other logical facts that constitute intensional thought. It should be noted that we are forbidden to associate intensional thought with a state of the world vis-à-vis (for example, a state of the brain, a place or a moment of the world) because both are "outside" the jurisdiction of isomorphism. Let us simply say that from this intensional thought emerges for the subject all representations, of the world and of itself. This simple remark must make us feel and humbly contemplate the unimaginable complexity of the intensionality of thought. Note that the distinction made here between conjecture of B, experience of B and intensional thought is only a heuristic facility. One could then write the relationship in a probabilistic form: Pr (sensation of B) = Pr ( sensation of B|experience of B) + Pr ( sensation of B|conjecture of B) + Pr(sensation of B|intensional thought) Paraphrasing Schopenhauer, the fact that experience of B seems to our conscience as the "last change" does not actually give it any superiority over others (... facts that make up the thought) to establish the sensation of B. We are very far from the original pattern which presented the sensation of B as a direct consequence of B, determined in the world, transmitted to the understanding, already existing and individuated as such, a necessary condition for the fact of knowledge "I know that B". It is clear from this that, precisely because intensional thought is informal, we cannot say that Pr(sensation of B|non-B ) = 0. The intensional thought including conjecture of B, derived from the representation of A, makes possible the sensation of B and thus the representation of B by the subject, even if "B" is not true. The representation of the world through thought has its own persistence. The probability of "I know that B" if "I know that A" is not zero. From this, our dreams have since long attested. From that : representation of A, makes possible representation of A This possibility is sufficient for the endogenous emergence of "I know that A, B, etc." no longer as Facts of thought equivalent to facts of the world but as attractors in the relational chaos that is intensional thought. Yet the laws of intensional thought are those of relational chaos, while the laws of the world as we describe them at the macroscopic level are the result of causalities. The attractors of relational chaos are infinitely more persistent than the results of an infinite sequence of causalities. The contrary chances that might alter the course of the development of my thought are infinitely less likely considering its extent than are the contrary chances that could alter, in the (supposed) real world, the course of A→B The realization of (I know that B) from (I know that A) depends infinitely little on a hypothetical realization of B from A. To think that "I know that B" can be invalidated by "non-B" is to confuse the thought/subject in which this possibility exists and the thought/object or intensional thought in which this possibility is infinitely low. The scientific method does not validate the isomorphism between the world and its representation, nor even the need for a form of the world. Memories, for example, are evidence of the persistence of meaning in thought without the experience of the object. Dreams are evidence of the ability of intensional thought to create a persistent sensation without the experience of the object. It follows that: Experience cannot be used to validate representation. The complexity of intensional thought as relational chaos is sufficient to allow the continuity of representation. The laws of thought are sufficient to provide a continuous, persistent, predictable representation. The laws of the world cannot be distinguished from the laws by which representation emerges from intensional thought. The laws of a physical world opposite are not necessary. The forms of the world resulting from these laws cannot be distinguished from the laws of thought. They have no object. It should be remembered that intensional thought should not be described as a "thing" or a "phenomenon" in the usual sense of the terms. On the one hand, since dicible Facts, space and time emerge from intensional thought, its "substance" cannot be adequately described by these concepts. On the other hand, since the One is representation, i.e. also emerges from intensional thought, it is necessarily unfounded: without primary element or Fact. PS: We have shown in the main part of the article, that representations of the world by several knowing subjects can be rendered isomorphic, which also renders obsolete a validation by shared experiences. All this will allow (I hope) the reader to deepen the meaning of these few aphorisms due to L. Wittgenstein (ref: "On certainty" Gallimard.): 105 Any verification of what is admitted as true, any confirmation or reversal are already taking place within a system. And certainly this system is not a more or less arbitrary or dubious starting point for our arguments; on the contrary, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the starting point of arguments as their vital environment 110... as if there was not a time when the quest for the foundation comes to an end. But at this term, it is not unfounded presupposition, it is the unfounded way of proceeding. 140. We do not learn the practice of empirical judgment by learning rules; we are taught judgments and their connection to other judgments. It is a totality of judgments that are made plausible to us. 142 ; These are not isolated axioms that seem obvious to me, but a system in which consequences and premises give each other support. 225 What I stand firmly at is not a proposal but a nest of proposals. The system of all the things we hold true (true things or true system) 232 Each of these facts taken in isolation, we can question it, but all of them we cannot question. ... That we don't question all of them is simply the way we judge, and therefore we act 205 If the truth is what is founded, then the foudation is not true, nor is it false. The author : Jean-Louis Boucon E-mail : boucon.jean-louis@neuf.fr Blog : http://jlboucon-philo.over-blog.com/ References : Ref : Whitehead Modes of thoughts lectures 1-importance & 4-perspectives A.N. Whitehead pub. MacMilan New york 1938 Ref : Simondon Du mode d'existence des objets techniques Gilbert Simondon édition de Nathalie Simondon ( Aubier, 2012) Ref LDP: Le discours politique L Guespin, JB Marcellesi, D Maldidier, S Slatka revue langages ed sept 1971 N°23 Ref Wittgenstein De la certitude L Wittgenstein ed Gallimard Other publications by the author : Ref OdC: Introduction to Ontology of Knowledges Jean-Louis Boucon. Uploaded on Academia.edu Ref PLOC: The philisophy of language and the Ontology of Knowledges Jean-Louis Boucon. Uploaded on Academia.edu Ref LAEG: The Ontology of Knowledges, logic, arithmétics, sets theory and geométry Jean-Louis Boucon Uploaded on Academia.edu Ref BQOC: QBism with Ontology of Knowledges Jean-Louis Boucon Uploaded on Academia.edu Ref CNT: A naturel concept of time Jean-Louis Boucon Uploaded on Academia.edu Ref FOUND: The concept of Foundation and Ontology of Knowledges Jean-Louis Boucon Uploaded on Academia.edu Ref MOND: Ontology of Knowledges and the form of the world Jean-Louis Boucon Uploaded on Academia.edu Ref UPF : L'Univers n'a pas la forme Jean-Louis Boucon Ed. Mon petit éditeur